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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s long-
awaited decision in Verizon v. FCC1 represents a major milestone in the 
debate over network neutrality that has dominated communications policy 
for the past decade. In upholding some parts while striking down other parts 
of the FCC’s Open Internet Order,2 the court reached two major conclusions 
that together represent both a partial victory and partial defeat for proponents 
and opponents of network neutrality alike. First, the court ruled that section 
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 19963 affirmatively grants the FCC 
the authority to regulate broadband access providers’ treatment of Internet 
traffic.4 Second, the court ruled that the Order’s nondiscrimination and anti-
blocking rules represented an invalid exercise of that authority because they 
contravened other express statutory mandates.5 
In striking down these rules, the court appeared to provide a roadmap 
showing a way to reconstitute nondiscrimination and anti-blocking rules that 
would withstand judicial scrutiny. 6  Wanting to avoid the risk of being 
rebuked on network neutrality a third time, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler 
proposed rules that adhered closely to the path laid out by the court with 
respect to the nondiscrimination and anti-blocking rules, while beefing up 
the transparency rules that withstood judicial review.7 Advocates of network 
neutrality criticized the proposal for its failure to reinstate a 
nondiscrimination mandate.8 The resulting political pressure led Chairman 
Wheeler to include language in the proposed rule seeking comment on the 
more radical step of bringing broadband access within the regulatory regime 
that governs traditional telephone service. 9  Nondiscrimination has thus 
emerged as the focus of the network neutrality debate. Although the Open 
Internet Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that the FCC adopted on May 15, 
2014, attempts to characterize nondiscrimination as part of a decade-long, 
                                                                                                                          
 1. 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 2. Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order], aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Verizon v. FCC, 
740 F.3d 623, 636–42 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 3. 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006). 
 4. 740 F.3d at 635–49. 
 5. Id. at 649–59. 
 6. Id. at 657–58. 
 7. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 
FCC Rcd. 5561, 5585–92 paras. 66–86, 5595–98 paras. 94–104, 5602–08 paras. 116–136 
(2014) [hereinafter 2014 Open Internet NPRM], available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-61A1.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, F.C.C., in a Shift, Backs Fast Lanes for Web Traffic, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/04/24/technology/fcc-new-net-neutrality-rules.html?_r=0.  
 9. 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 7, at 5612–16 paras. 148–155. 
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bipartisan policy,10  nondiscrimination did not appear in either Chairman 
Michael Powell’s initial 2004 exposition of Internet freedoms11 and from the 
FCC’s 2005 Policy Statement.12 Instead, nondiscrimination emerged as an 
issue somewhat later in the debate, when Commissioner Michael Copps 
began to call for it in a series of separate statements and speeches. 13 
Moreover, the FCC attempts to characterize its actions in the SBC/AT&T, 
Verizon/MCI, and AT&T/BellSouth mergers and the Adelphia spinoff as 
supporting network neutrality.14 As a formal matter, however, in each of 
those cases the FCC actually found competition to be sufficiently robust and 
the record sufficiently bare of evidence of discrimination to justify declining 
to mandate nondiscriminatory access to their last-mile broadband networks, 
although the FCC did accept voluntary commitments to abide by the 2005 
Policy Statement as being in the public interest.15 
                                                                                                                          
 10. Id. at 5565–69 paras. 11–24. 
 11. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding 
Principles for the Industry, Remarks Delivered to the Silicon Flatirons Symposium (Feb. 8, 
2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf. 
 12. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005). 
 13. See, e.g., Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast 
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13080 (2008) (statement of Copps, Comm’r); Broadband 
Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 FCC Rcd. 7894, 7903 (2007) (Copps, Comm’r, 
concurring); Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of 
Licenses, Adelphia Communications Corp., (and Subsidiaries, Debtors-in-Possession), 
Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (Subsidiaries), Assignees Adelphia, Communications 
Corp., (and Subsidiaries, Debtors-in-Possession), Assignors and Transferors, to Comcast 
Corp. (Subsidiaries), Assignees and Transferees, Comcast Corp., Transferor, to Time Warner 
Inc., Transferee, Time Warner Inc., Transferor, to Comcast Corp., Transferee, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd. 8203, 8368 (2006) (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting); Michael 
J. Copps, Acting Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Free Press Summit: 
Changing Media. (May 14, 2009), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-290735A1.pdf; Michael J. Copps, 
Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at Pike & Fischer’s Broadband Policy Summit 
IV (June 12, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
282890A1.pdf; Michael J. Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at En Banc 
Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices, Stanford University (Apr. 17, 2008), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-281625A1.pdf; 
Michael J. Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at En Banc Hearing on 
Broadband Network Management Practices, Cambridge, Massachusetts (Feb. 25, 2008), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-280440A1.pdf. 
 14. 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 7, at 5566 para. 14. 
 15. AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of Control, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd. 5662, 5724–27 paras. 116–120, 5738–39 
paras. 151–153 (2007); Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of 
Control of Licenses: Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc., 
Assignees, Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of 
Licenses: Adelphia Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), 
Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees et al., Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 21 FCC Rcd. 8203, 8296–99 paras. 217–223 (2006); Verizon Communications, 
Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion 
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This essay explores both of these conclusions. Part I critiques the 
Verizon court’s potentially expansive reading of section 706, examining how 
it may expand FCC’s authority beyond broadband access providers to 
encompass content and application providers (dubbed “edge providers” by 
the court)16 and showing how this reading runs counter to standard principles 
of statutory interpretation. Part II discusses the limitations the court placed 
on how the FCC can exercise its section 706 authority, concluding that these 
limits prevent the FCC from imposing the type of nondiscrimination mandate 
that many regard as the central focus of network neutrality. Part III explores 
the implications of the court’s decision, examining the potential for state 
broadband regulation, the possibility of Title II reclassification, the future of 
the wireless exception, and the prospects for a regime based on case-by-case 
adjudication. 
II. SECTION 706 AS A GRANT OF AUTHORITY 
The portion of the Verizon opinion with the most potentially sweeping 
implications for the future of the Internet is the court’s expansive reading of 
section 706.17 Understanding these implications requires some background 
on the federal communications statute, the Communications Act of 1934. 
When first enacted, the Act contained six titles, four of which were 
procedural, not substantive.18 Title I laid out the general provisions regarding 
the number, qualifications, and terms of FCC Commissioners and defined a 
number of statutory terms. 19  Title IV contained provisions governing 
procedural and administrative matters. 20  Title V addressed penal 
enforcement and forfeitures. 21  Title VI dealt with miscellaneous 
housekeeping matters, such as abolishing the Federal Radio Commission—
the precursor to the FCC—and transferring its property and personnel to the 
FCC.22  
The Act’s primary substantive provisions were contained in Title II, 
which governed common carriers,23  and Title III, which governed radio 
                                                                                                                          
and Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 18433, 18507–09 paras. 139–142 (2005); SBC Communications Inc. 
and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 18290, 18366–67 paras. 140–143 (2005). 
 16. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 17. 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006). 
 18. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 19. Id. §§ 1–5, 48 Stat. at 1064–70 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–162 
(2006)). 
 20. Id. §§ 401–416, 48 Stat. at 1092–1100 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 401–
416 (2006)). 
 21. Id. §§ 501–505, 48 Stat. at 1100–01 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 501–505 
(2006)). 
 22. Id. §§ 601–609, 48 Stat. at 1101–05 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 601–609 
(2006)). 
 23. Id. §§ 201–221, 48 Stat. at 1070–81 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 
(2006)). 
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communications.24 In 1984, Congress replaced the old Title VI with a new 
substantive title to govern cable communications and renumbered the old 
procedural Title VI as Title VII.25 
Three provisions of Title I are particularly relevant to the network 
neutrality debate. Section 1 recognizes that Congress created the 
Commission “[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign 
commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so 
far as possible, to all people of the United States . . . a rapid, efficient, 
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with 
adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”26 Section 2(a) provides that “[t]he 
provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate and foreign 
communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission 
of energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within the United 
States.”27 Section 4(i) states that “[t]he Commission may perform any and 
all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not 
inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its 
functions.”28  
The FCC has sometimes cited these provisions of Title I as if they 
represented substantive grants of authority. 29  The problem with this 
approach should be apparent to every law student and lawyer. The FCC has 
conceded that statements of purpose, like those contained in section 1, 
delegate no regulatory authority. 30  Moreover, courts and the FCC have 
analogized section 4(i) to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the 
Constitution,31 which authorizes Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the federal 
government’s enumerated powers.32  Although the Necessary and Proper 
                                                                                                                          
 24. Id. §§ 301–329, 48 Stat. at 1081–92 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 301–329 
(2006)). 
 25. Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–559 (2006)). 
 26. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 27. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006). 
 28. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006). A similar provision in Title III (governing broadcasting) 
similarly provides that “the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, 
or necessity require shall . . . [m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions 
and conditions not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of 
this Act.” Id. § 303(r). 
 29. See, e.g., Implementation of Video Description of Video Programming, Report and 
Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 15230, 1525–53 para. 54 (2000), rev’d sub nom. Motion Picture Ass’n 
of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 802, 803–06 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 30. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 31. See, e.g., N. Am. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Stale or Moot Docketed Proceedings, 1993 Annual Access Tariff Filing Phase I, Order, 19 
FCC Rcd. 2527, 2531 para. 12 (2004); Adoption of a Mandatory FCC Registration Number, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 24370, 24378 n.31 (2000); Review of the 
Pioneer’s Preference Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Remand, 9 FCC Rcd. 4055, 
4062 para. 29 & n.70 (1994); Application of Nationwide Wireless Corp., Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 3635, 3641 para. 26 & n.75(1994). 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Clause extends Congress’ authority beyond the strict letter of the enumerated 
powers, it is not itself a separate grant of authority. It still must be exercised 
with respect to some enumerated power granted to Congress by Article I, 
Section 8, or some other explicit provision of the Constitution.33  
Nonetheless, the FCC has repeatedly invoked these provisions as if 
they were independent grants of authority to regulate Internet access. For 
example, in the Second Computer Inquiry, the FCC ruled that the enhanced 
services that were the direct antecedent to the Internet34 were not subject to 
Title II. 35  Instead, the FCC relied on its Title I jurisdiction, explicitly 
rejecting the argument that the provisions of Titles II or III in any way limited 
its authority. 36  The D.C. Circuit affirmed both conclusions on judicial 
review.37 Over two decades later, dicta in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet 
Services similarly suggested that the FCC possessed ancillary authority 
under Title I to impose access requirements on broadband access providers.38 
However, the D.C. Circuit’s 2005 decision in American Library Association 
v. FCC made clear that the FCC must do more than simply cite the general 
provisions from Title I to justify regulating under its ancillary jurisdiction.39 
Ancillary jurisdiction must be invoked with respect to one of the specific 
statutory responsibilities Congress delegated to the FCC in the substantive 
titles of the Communications Act.40 In 2010, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed this 
principle in Comcast v. FCC, which overturned the FCC’s attempt to 
sanction Comcast for rate-limiting certain peer-to-peer applications. 41 
Together, these decisions stand for the very reasonable proposition that Title 
I ancillary jurisdiction is not an independent grant of authority. Instead, it 
must be asserted in conjunction with some explicit substantive grant of 
                                                                                                                          
 33. For the classic citation, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 
(1819). For a more recent restatement of this principle, see Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 
361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960) (“[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause . . . . is not itself a grant of 
power, but a caveat that the Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the 
specifically granted foregoing powers of [section] 8 and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 34. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976–77 
(2005); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 629–30 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 35. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77  384, 428–32 paras. 115–123 (1980), aff’d sub nom. 
Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (CCIA). 
 36. 77 F.C.C.2d at 432 paras. 124–125. 
 37. CCIA, 693 F.2d at 209–11, 213–14.  
 38. 545 U.S. 967, 976, 996, 1002 (2005), aff’g Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access 
to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4841–42 paras. 75–79 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem 
Declaratory Ruling]. 
 39. 406 F.3d 689, 691–93, 699–700 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 40. Id. 
 41. 600 F.3d 642, 654–56 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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authority from Congress in Titles II, III, or VI. 42  Simply put, Title I 
jurisdiction cannot be “ancillary to nothing.”43 
The Comcast court then reviewed the statutory provisions that the FCC 
offered to support its exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, only to find them 
wanting.44 Most importantly for this essay’s purposes, the court rejected the 
FCC’s attempt to tie its ancillary jurisdiction to section 706, reasoning that 
the FCC had ruled in an earlier order that section 706 did not represent an 
independent grant of authority.45 The opinion implied that the FCC remained 
free to revisit this conclusion so long as it did so through official agency 
action and offered a sufficient explanation of its decision to change 
policies.46 
The FCC took the D.C. Circuit up on this invitation in issuing the 2010 
Open Internet Order, in which the agency explicitly disavowed its earlier 
conclusion that section 706 was not an affirmative grant of authority. 47 
Instead, the FCC concluded that section 706 indeed gave it the authority to 
regulate broadband service providers’ network management practices, such 
as blocking Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) communications or 
degrading online video. 48  The D.C. Circuit affirmed this conclusion in 
Verizon on judicial review.49 
A. The Text of Section 706 
Given that section 706 represented the sole basis for the Verizon 
court’s conclusion that the FCC has the authority to regulate network 
management practices,50 the text of that provision merits close examination. 
The full statutory provision is as follows: 
(a) The Commission and each State commission with 
regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall 
encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of 
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans 
                                                                                                                          
 42. See id. at 654; Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 699–700. 
 43. Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 702. 
 44. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651–61. 
 45. Id. at 658–59. 
 46. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 
(2005) (“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s 
interpretation under the Chevron framework . . . . For if the agency adequately explains the 
reasons for a reversal of policy, change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron 
is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing 
agency.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC, 467 
U.S. 837, 863 (1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”); 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) 
(“[R]egulatory agencies . . . must be given ample latitude to adapt their rules and policies to 
the demands of changing circumstances.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 2, at 17969 n.370. 
 48. Id. at 17969 para. 120. 
 49. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 636–42 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 50. Id. 
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(including, in particular, elementary and secondary schools and 
classrooms) by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, 
regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in 
the local telecommunications market, or other regulating 
methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment. 
(b) The Commission shall, within 30 months after 
February 8, 1996, and annually thereafter, initiate a notice of 
inquiry concerning the availability of advanced 
telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in 
particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms) 
and shall complete the inquiry within 180 days after its 
initiation. In the inquiry, the Commission shall determine 
whether advanced telecommunications capability is being 
deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion. If 
the Commission's determination is negative, it shall take 
immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by 
removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting 
competition in the telecommunications market.51 
The Verizon court deferred to the FCC’s conclusion that subsections 
(a) and (b) of section 706 each represent affirmative grants of authority.52 
Subsection (a) explicitly authorizes the FCC to use four types of regulatory 
measures: (1) price cap regulation,53 (2) regulatory forbearance, (3) measures 
that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, and (4) 
other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure.54 The court 
held that, although subsection (a) could be read as simply setting forth a 
statement of congressional policy, it “could just as easily be read to vest the 
Commission with actual authority to utilize such ‘regulating methods’ to 
meet this stated goal.”55 The fact that the court’s discussion of subsection (a) 
focuses exclusively on the scope of “regulating methods” indicates that the 
court saw (4) as the basis for the FCC’s jurisdiction.56  
                                                                                                                          
 51. 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006). 
 52. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 637–42. 
 53. Price cap regulation is an alternative approach to setting rates that differed from 
traditional cost-of-service ratemaking. The traditional approach based rates on the costs 
incurred by the provider plus a rate of return. Price caps set rates by calculating a base year 
and then adjusting the rates for inflation and increases in productivity. Because rates were no 
longer determined by costs, it was hoped that price caps would provide stronger incentives to 
innovate and reduce costs and eliminate any biases towards capital-intensive solutions. Price 
caps are generally characterized as a less intrusive approach to setting rates. See Christopher 
S. Yoo, Is There a Role for Common Carriage in an Internet-Based World?, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 
545, 595–600 (2013). 
 54. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006). 
 55. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 637–38. 
 56. Id. 
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By its own terms, subsection (b) serves as a grant of authority only if 
the FCC finds that advanced telecommunications capability is not being 
deployed in a “reasonable and timely fashion.”57 If so, the FCC is authorized 
to employ two remedies: (1) removing barriers to infrastructure investment 
and (2) promoting competition in the telecommunications market.58 These 
are essentially identical to the fourth and third measures, respectively, 
authorized by subsection (a),59 making the analysis of the scope of the two 
subsections essentially parallel. 
The Verizon court held that section 706(b) also gives the FCC statutory 
authority to regulate broadband providers.60 Under this provision, if the FCC 
concludes that “advanced telecommunications capability is [not] being 
deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion,” it “shall take 
immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing 
barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the 
telecommunications market.”61  Again, the specified means of “removing 
barriers to infrastructure investment and . . . promoting competition in the 
telecommunications market” mirror the language of the third and fourth 
clauses of section 706(a).62 Therefore, the same arguments advanced above 
apply. 
More importantly, the FCC is authorized to act under section 706(b) 
only if it finds that advanced telecommunications capability—defined by the 
statute to include broadband63—is not “being deployed to all Americans in a 
reasonable and timely fashion.”64  The first five annual reports the FCC 
issued pursuant to its section 706 inquiry each concluded that broadband 
deployment met the requisite standard.65 Only in the FCC’s sixth section 706 
report—the first one following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Comcast Corp. 
v. FCC to reject the statutory provisions the FCC first proffered as bases for 
its jurisdiction and the last one issued prior to the Open Internet Order—did 
the FCC find broadband deployment to be inadequate.66 The Verizon court 
recognized that “[t]he timing of the Commission’s determination is certainly 
                                                                                                                          
 57. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2006). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 1302(a). 
 60. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 640–42 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 61. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2006). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. § 1302(d)(1) (“The term ‘advanced telecommunications capability’ is defined, 
without regard to any transmission media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband 
telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, 
data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology.”). 
 64. Id. § 1302(b). 
 65. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such 
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, as Amended by the 
Broadband Data Improvement Act, Sixth Broadband Deployment Report, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 
9693–94 (2010) (McDowell, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 9558 para. 2.  
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suspicious.”67 The agency continued to find broadband deployment to be 
inadequate in its two subsequent section 706 reports.68  
Under the Bush administration, the FCC was criticized for its tardiness 
in issuing annual reports.69 Under the Obama administration, the agency has 
better adhered to statutory deadlines,70 consistently issuing its annual section 
706 reports somewhere between May and August each year from 2009 to 
2012. Had the FCC adhered to this historical pattern, it should have issued 
its ninth section 706 report no later than August 2013. Instead, two years 
elapsed until August 2014 when the agency solicited input on its tenth annual 
section 706 report instead of issuing its ninth annual report despite the fact 
that two years had passed since the issuance of the eighth report.71 One can 
only speculate as to why.  
Interestingly, the primary basis for the FCC’s 2012 finding that 
broadband deployment was not reasonable and timely was the fact that, as of 
June 2011, 19 million Americans—or 6% of the population—lacked access 
to broadband, which the FCC defined as service providing download speeds 
of 4 Mbps or higher.72 As Commissioner Pai pointed out in his dissent, 
however, if the report had taken into account mobile wireless broadband, it 
would have reduced the number of unserved Americans to 5.5 million—or 
1.7% of the population.73  Moreover, the 2012 report was based on data 
                                                                                                                          
 67. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 642. 
 68. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such 
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, as Amended by the 
Broadband Data Improvement Act, Eighth Broadband Progress Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 10342, 
10344 para. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Eighth Broadband Progress Report]; Inquiry Concerning 
the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and 
Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 
of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, As Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 
Seventh Broadband Progress Report and Order on Reconsideration, 26 FCC Rcd. 8008, 8009 
para. 1 (2011). 
 69. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 110TH CONG., DECEPTION 
AND DISTRUST: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION UNDER CHAIRMAN KEVIN J. 
MARTIN 13–14 (Comm. Print 2008). 
 70. But see 2014 Quadrennial Regulatory Review — Review of the Commission's 
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd. 4371, 4583 
(2014) (statement of Wheeler, Chairman) (acknowledging the FCC’s failure to complete its 
quadrennial review of media ownership rules by the 2010 statutory deadline and committing 
to complete the process by June 2016), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-28A1.pdf. 
 71. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability 
to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such 
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, as Amended by the 
Broadband Data Improvement Act, Tenth Broadband Progress Notice of Inquiry, 29 FCC 
Rcd. 9747 (2014), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-
113A1_Rcd.pdf. 
 72. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 68, at 10344 para. 1, 10370 
para. 46, 10400–01 para. 135. 
 73. Id. at 10519–20 (Pai, Comm’r, dissenting). 
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reflecting the earliest stages of the deployment of the fourth-generation 
wireless technology known as Long-Term Evolution (“LTE”).74 Since that 
time, Verizon has completed its LTE buildout, 75  while AT&T’s LTE 
network now reaches 80% of the U.S. population and is scheduled for 
completion by the end of 2014.76 Sprint and T-Mobile are racing to catch up: 
each carrier reached at least 200 million people by the end of 2013 and is 
projected to reach 80% of the country sometime during 2014.77 In addition, 
recent studies indicate that Verizon’s, AT&T’s, and T-Mobile’s LTE 
offerings provide average download speeds of 12 to 19 Mbps and peak 
download speeds of 49 to 66 Mbps.78 The near ubiquity of LTE suggests that 
the number of people who cannot access broadband that meets or exceeds 
the FCC’s 4 Mbps standard is now likely considerably less than the 1.7% 
reported as of June 2011. 79  And, again, if broadband deployment is 
reasonable and timely, section 706(b) provides the FCC no authority to act. 
B. The Court’s Expansive Reading of Section 706 
The Verizon court made no claim that the nondiscrimination and anti-
blocking rules fell within the first three measures authorized by section 
706(a). Instead, the court explicitly invoked the fourth type of measure 
authorized by the statute, focusing its discussion entirely on “regulating 
methods.”80 
At first glance, a regulation blocking broadband access providers from 
charging edge providers premium prices for premium services would seem 
more likely to create barriers to infrastructure investment than to remove 
                                                                                                                          
 74. Id. at 10347–48 para. 6.  
 75. Christopher S. Yoo, Technological Determinism and Its Discontents, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 914, 923–24 (2014). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 923. Some commentators argue that even though LTE is able to delivery faster 
download speeds, monthly data caps prevent wireless broadband from being a true substitute 
for fixed broadband. See Hibah Hussain et al., New Am. Found. Open Technology Inst., 
Capping the Nation’s Broadband Future? 12 (2012), available at 
http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/CappingTheNationsBroadband
Future.pdf. This argument ignores the fact that while LTE providers initially focused on the 
broadest possible coverage, they have now turned towards densification, which increases the 
capacity of the network. These arguments are also undercut by the fact that two of the national 
providers (T-Mobile and Sprint) offer unlimited data plans. 
 79. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 68, at 10519–20 (Pai, Comm’r, 
dissenting). 
 80. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 636–40 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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them.81 Such a rule would, after all, benefit edge providers at the expense of 
broadband Internet access providers.82 
Nevertheless, the court accepted the FCC’s assertion that fostering and 
preserving edge providers represented an important indirect way to promote 
infrastructure investment.83 The FCC reasoned that nondiscrimination and 
anti-blocking rules facilitate innovation by edge providers, thereby leading 
to increased demand for bandwidth by end users and spurring greater 
investment in infrastructure in turn. 84  Read in this manner, section 706 
authorizes the FCC not only to adopt measures that promote investment in 
infrastructure directly, but also to promote activities that tangentially 
encourage infrastructure investment. 
What is most striking about this reasoning is its potential 
expansiveness. Under this approach, the FCC would not only have the 
authority to institute measures that promote infrastructure investment 
directly, but also to regulate anything that indirectly affects infrastructure 
investment as well. In this sense, the court’s reasoning is similar to the 
reasoning followed in a case well known to every first-year law student: 
Wickard v. Filburn.85 The explicit terms of the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution give Congress the power to regulate only commerce “with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”86 
Before Wickard, the Supreme Court forbade the federal government from 
asserting jurisdiction over commerce that was purely intrastate. 87  In 
Wickard, however, the Court abandoned this vision of dual sovereignty and 
extended federal jurisdiction to purely intrastate activities that had a 
tangential impact on interstate commerce.88 Because almost everything has 
a putative tangential impact on commerce, Wickard opened the door to an 
expansion of the commerce power such that left few activities outside its 
scope.89 
The Verizon court’s reasoning about section 706 could potentially 
have a similar effect. Expanding the FCC’s jurisdiction beyond activities that 
                                                                                                                          
 81. See Brief for Appellant at 30–31, Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(No. 11-1355) (“[T]he Commission’s daisy chain of speculative inferences that the rules will 
encourage deployment is contradicted by the record and common sense: regulations that 
require providers to carry all traffic and prohibit compensation from edge providers for 
carriage will have precisely the opposite effect, as world-renowned economists explained 
below.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. 740 F.3d at 634, 643–45. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 87. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 88. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124. 
 89. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964). For the exceptions, which are notable primarily for their rarity, see United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
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have a direct impact on infrastructure investment to encompass those that 
have a tangential impact on infrastructure investment represents a significant 
extension of the FCC’s power. Indeed, it potentially leaves the door open for 
the FCC to take measures aimed directly at the content and application 
industries—a prospect widely feared by advocates and critics of network 
neutrality alike.90  The history of FCC regulation of broadcast television 
networks is instructive. After initially denying that it had the authority to 
regulate television networks directly, the FCC later invoked an expansive 
reading of ancillary jurisdiction to impose a wide range of restrictions on 
them.91 The FCC could well follow the same course here and eventually 
regulate edge providers, although, as discussed below, the D.C. Circuit’s 
precedents on ancillary jurisdiction do impose some limits on the FCC’s 
authority. 
C. The Impact of the Canons of Construction 
Proper application of well-established principles of administrative law 
and statutory construction indicate that the Verizon court should not have 
condoned the FCC’s construction of section 706 so readily. As the Verizon 
court correctly observed,92 the proper standard for reviewing an agency’s 
construction of its statutory authority is the familiar two-step analysis 
established by the Supreme Court in Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.93  In step one, a reviewing court asks whether the 
statute’s text “directly addresse[s] the precise question at issue.”94 If not, step 
two requires that the court defer to the agency’s construction of the statute 
so long as it is reasonable or permissible.95  
Arguably, the Verizon court’s analysis of section 706 fails at step one. 
Chevron itself recognizes that in step one, a court should employ the 
“traditional tools of statutory construction.” 96  These tools are generally 
recognized to include descriptive canons of construction that reflect the 
                                                                                                                          
 90. See, e.g., Comments of Public Knowledge and Common Cause at 28, Open Internet 
Remand, Public Notice, FCC GN Docket No. 14-28 (rel. Feb. 19, 2014), available at 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/documents/Public_Knowledge_ 
Common_Cause_Open_Internet_706_Public_Notice_Comments.pdf (“The breadth of 
authority contained with these principles raises the possibility of the Commission having 
authority to promulgate rules of all sorts, so long as they could rationally be said to contribute 
to the deployment of broadband. For instance, the case could be made that the prevalence of 
adult content online was discouraging certain households from adopting broadband; therefore, 
decency regulations on online content could be promulgated under section 706.”). 
 91. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority 
Over Commercial Television Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 
403, 432–33, 440–45 (1982). 
 92. 740 F.3d at 635. 
 93. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 94. Id. at 843. 
 95. Id. at 845. 
 96. Id. at 843 n.9. 
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normal rules of syntax and linguistics.97 When applying Chevron step one, 
the Supreme Court has held that “under the established interpretative canons 
of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, where general words follow 
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed 
to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the 
preceding specific words.”98 Indeed, it is not even clear that these principles 
can be properly regarded as canons. The Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t 
is a familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list 
should be given related meaning” and that “[o]ne hardly need rely on such 
Latin phrases as ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis to reach this obvious 
conclusion.” 99  Consequently, courts have routinely included ejusdem 
generis and noscitur a sociis in their Chevron step one analyses.100 
The phrase on which the Verizon court relied, “other regulating 
methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment,” is a classic 
“catchall” clause. Ejusdem generis thus requires that its scope be limited to 
the terms that precede it. 101  All of the items in the list preceding this 
catchall—“price cap regulation,” “regulatory forbearance,” and “measures 
that promote competition in the local telecommunications market”102— are 
deregulatory in focus. This renders problematic the court’s interpretation of 
the catchall to justify imposing more restrictive regulation.103 
Despite the court’s emphasis on “regulatory methods,” a brief passage 
later in the opinion suggests that the court may have relied on the provision 
of section 706 authorizing the FCC to adopt “measures that promote 
                                                                                                                          
 97. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 
675 (2000); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 745 
(2004); Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 
348–49, 351 (2007) (reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006)). Descriptive canons, which are 
textual and syntactical rules governing language and structure, stand in stark contrast to 
normative canons, which import substantive principles into statutory interpretation and thus 
are more controversial. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of 
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 71–72 (2008); Bradley, supra, at 675–76; 
Nelson, supra, at 348–50, 355–60; see also VERMUELE, supra, at 198–202 (criticizing 
allowing descriptive canons to trump Chevron deference, but acknowledging that normative 
canons are more problematic). 
 98. Wash. State Dep’t. of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 
U.S. 371, 384 (2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 99. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 & n.16 (1977) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100. See, e.g., Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 384 (noscitur a sociis and 
ejusdem generis); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (noscitur a 
sociis); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noscitur 
a sociis). 
 101.  See, e.g., Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 601 (1980) (“The rule of 
ejusdem generis ordinarily ‘limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar 
to those specified.’” (citing Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936)). 
 102. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006). 
 103. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 636–40 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
430 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 66 
 
 
competition in the local telecommunications market.” 104  This does not 
change the analysis, however. As the Supreme Court has explained, terms in 
an enumerated list are construed using “[t]he familiar canon of noscitur a 
sociis, the interpretive rule that words and people are known by their 
companions.” 105  Thus, just as ejusdem generis counsels in favor of 
construing a catchall term in light of the other terms in a list, noscitur a sociis 
leads to the same conclusion with respect to enumerated terms. The same 
logic would militate in favor of construing this term as being limited to 
deregulatory measures. 
D. The Legislative History of Section 706 
The legislative history of section 706 also casts doubt on the Verizon 
court’s construction of the statute. According to the conference report 
accompanying the Telecommunications Act of 1996, section 706 originated 
in a provision in the Senate bill that had no counterpart in the House 
version.106 The Senate provision was part of a title of the bill entitled “An 
End to Regulation” and was preceded by provisions entitled “Transition to 
competitive pricing,” “Biennial review of regulations; elimination of 
unnecessary regulations and functions,” and “Regulatory forbearance.”107 
The overall sweep of these provisions was to lessen regulation, not increase 
it. 
Moreover, during the preceding Congress, the Senate Commerce 
Committee reported a bill in 1994 containing a provision that appears to be 
the antecedent to section 706.108 This provision, the final provision of the 
bill, stated: 
(a) PROMOTION OF ADVANCED 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK CAPABILITY – 
The Commission shall promote to all Americans, regardless of 
location or disability, the deployment of switched, broadband, 
telecommunications networks capable of enabling users to 
originate and receive affordable and accessible high quality 
voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications services. In 
promoting the deployment of such networks, the Commission 
shall, to the maximum extent feasible, rely on competition 
among telecommunications providers. In the event the 
Commission determines that users are not gaining reasonable 
and timely access to switched, broadband, telecommunications 
network capabilities, the Commission shall have the authority 
to provide sufficient incentives such that this access is achieved.  
                                                                                                                          
 104. Id. at 642–43. 
 105. Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2201 (2013).  
 106. S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 210 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 107. Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, S. 652, 104th 
Cong. (1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. 16346, 27846 (1995). 
 108. Communications Act of 1994, S. 1822, 103d Cong. (1994). 
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(b) RULEMAKING.-If the Commission finds in its 
inquiry proceedings or any other time that switched, broadband, 
telecommunications network capabilities are not being 
deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion, it 
shall commence a rulemaking to prescribe regulations using 
incentives to promote, to the maximum extent technically 
feasible and economically reasonable, the availability of 
switched, broadband, telecommunications network 
capabilities.109 
This language clearly identifies “competition among 
telecommunications providers” as the preferred method for promoting 
broadband deployment. Indeed, as the Senate Commerce Committee’s report 
that accompanied the bill emphasized: 
The Committee anticipates that this goal will be achieved 
through competition that is enhanced under the terms of this bill. 
But if this goal is not being achieved in a timely fashion, the 
FCC is authorized to act under this section to expedite 
deployment through the use of incentive regulation.110 
The legislative history thus evinces a clear emphasis on deregulation 
and competition among broadband access providers as the preferred way to 
promote broadband deployment. Moreover, the legislative history contains 
no hints that Congress regarded promoting innovation in content and 
applications as an appropriate course of action. 
E. The Questionable Empirical Foundation for the Court’s 
Reasoning 
The natural reading and the legislative history of the provisions 
authorizing the FCC to “promote competition in the local 
telecommunications market” and “remove barriers to infrastructure 
investment”111 suggest that these provisions are best construed as authorizing 
measures deregulating broadband access. The FCC nonetheless concluded 
that more intrusive regulation was justified because greater innovation in 
content and applications would create greater demand that would stimulate 
greater investment infrastructure. 112  The Verizon court held that this 
conclusion was backed by substantial evidence, citing two theoretical 
                                                                                                                          
 109. Id. 
 110. S. REP. NO. 103-367, at 103 (1994). Here, “incentive regulation” refers to price cap 
regulation. See Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward A New 
Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 59 (2007). 
 111. See 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006). 
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studies, one anecdote, and comments filed with the agency by two interested 
parties.113  
A close examination of the FCC’s 2010 order, however, reveals that 
its empirical record was quite thin. For example, the FCC based its 
conclusion in part on an empirical study that it claimed showed that 
consumers would be harmed if broadband access providers discriminated 
against particular edge providers on a single empirical study. 114 
Problematically, this study focused on the cable television industry, not on 
broadband providers—and even then, the study found no clear evidence of 
discrimination.115 Indeed, the peer reviewer for the FCC questioned whether 
the instrument on which this study relied could isolate the effect of the lack 
of openness.116  
Both the FCC and the Verizon court cited a well-known article on 
general purpose technologies (“GPTs”) by Timothy Bresnahan and Manuel 
Trajtenberg for the proposition that openness promotes infrastructure 
investment.117 But this paper actually concludes that GPTs create positive 
externalities and that the best way to mitigate the market failure created by 
these externalities would be to permit providers of GPTs to internalize those 
externalities through vertical integration or by entering into strategic 
alliances rather than forced openness.118 Ironically, the FCC cited this paper 
as support for a proposition contrary to the conclusion the authors actually 
reached.  
Arrayed against this claim is a growing corpus of empirical studies 
finding little evidence that access requirements promote investment and 
competition in broadband access networks. 119  The broader empirical 
literature on vertical restraints reveals that exclusivity or preferential 
contracts between suppliers and retail distributors are either neutral or 
welfare enhancing in the vast majority of cases.120 That said, the fact that the 
                                                                                                                          
 113. 740 F.3d at 644–45. 
 114. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 2, at 17918 para. 23 n.60 (citing Austan 
Goolsbee, Vertical Integration and the Market for Broadcast and Cable Television 
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D.C. Circuit has already upheld the conclusion that regulations mandating 
that broadband access providers give nondiscriminatory carriage to edge 
providers promotes infrastructure investment121 means that the FCC is likely 
to adopt the same reasoning in the current NPRM and that the Court of 
Appeals reviewing the most recent Open Internet Order is likely to uphold 
this conclusion. If the conclusion is erroneous, any correction will have to 
come from the Supreme Court. 
III. LIMITS ON THE FCC’S SECTION 706 AUTHORITY 
To say that section 706 grants the FCC affirmative authority to 
regulate broadband access is not to say that that authority is unbounded. The 
general subject matter limitations restrict the scope of the FCC’s authority, 
as does the Verizon court’s holding that section 706 cannot be used to impose 
common carriage. In addition, the jurisprudence on ancillary jurisdiction 
identifies other statutory provisions that limit the FCC’s exercise of 
authority. 
A. Statutory Limits on the FCC’s Jurisdiction 
The FCC and the Verizon court both recognized that the FCC’s 
jurisdiction is limited to “interstate and foreign communication by wire and 
radio” and the fact that any measures enacted under section 706 must be 
designed to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of 
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”122  
As noted in Part I.B, limiting an agency to interstate matters has long 
ceased to be a meaningful restriction on governmental power. Moreover, 
expanding section 706 authority to include all activities that have a tangential 
impact on infrastructure investment makes just about any measure affecting 
content and applications part of promoting broadband deployment. 
There is one aspect of prior court decisions on ancillary jurisdiction 
that may provide a limit on the FCC’s authority to regulate. In these 
decisions, once courts concluded that that the authority asserted by the 
agency was reasonably ancillary to some authority enumerated in Titles II, 
III, or VI, they proceeded to evaluate whether the particular exercise of 
ancillary jurisdiction ran afoul of any other statutory provisions. In so doing, 
these courts undertook an inquiry that was precisely parallel to the one 
followed by Verizon v. FCC with respect to section 706. 
In this respect, two cases on ancillary jurisdiction are particularly 
instructive. In Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the FCC 
had jurisdiction over all matters “affecting communications,” concluding 
instead that the agency’s authority was limited to the actual transmission of 
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radio or television signals. 123  In other words, the FCC does not have 
regulatory authority over activities simply because they have a tangential 
impact on the transmission communications by wire or radio. In this sense, 
the FCC’s authority is considerably narrower than Congress’ commerce 
power, which has long been recognized to extend to activities that “affect” 
interstate commerce even when they are not themselves part of interstate 
commerce.124 
Similarly, in Motion Picture Association of America v. FCC, the D.C. 
Circuit rejected arguments that the FCC possessed the authority to require 
that broadcasters include aural descriptions of a television program’s key 
visual elements during pauses in the program dialogue.125 The provision of 
the Communications Act giving the FCC jurisdiction over “all interstate and 
foreign communication by wire or radio” authorized the agency to impose 
regulations on transmissions that “incidentally and minimally affect[] 
program content.”126 It did not, however, give the agency authority to impose 
“a direct and significant regulation of program content” by requiring 
broadcasters to write scripts, select actors, decide what to describe and how, 
and choose the appropriate style and pace, all within “pauses that were not 
originally intended to be filled.”127 In short, the FCC’s statutory authority 
over wire and radio communications does not give it the authority to regulate 
content directly. 
The D.C. Circuit provided a more detailed discussion of this principle 
in American Library Ass’n v. FCC, in which the court ruled that the FCC 
lacked the authority to mandate that receivers recognize a code embedded in 
digital television programs that prevents their redistribution.128 The statute 
gives the FCC authority over devices engaged in interstate “communication” 
by radio or wire; it does not give the agency authority over devices when 
they are not engaged in radio or wire transmission, including television 
receivers after the digital broadcast has been completed.129 
Together, the courts’ precedents establish a number of important limits 
on the FCC’s ancillary authority. Although the FCC can impose regulations 
that have incidental and minimal effects on content, it lacks the authority to 
regulate content directly.130 In addition, the FCC has the authority to regulate 
communications only when they are being transmitted by wire or radio; it 
lacks any authority to regulate those communications after they have arrived 
and presumably before they have been sent.131 
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That said, the power to regulate communications while they are being 
transmitted does give the FCC considerable power over the economic 
relationships between content providers and network providers. For 
example, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that even though the FCC lacked the authority to regulate content 
directly, the FCC could restrict the terms of the contracts between broadcast 
stations and content providers in ways designed to reallocate the relative 
bargaining power between these entities.132 Thus, the FCC may be able to 
follow a similar path with respect to the Internet. 
B. Common Carriage as a Limit to Section 706 Authority 
The statutory limitation that the Verizon court spent the most time 
analyzing was the prohibition of the imposition of common carriage 
obligations on information services—including broadband access 
providers.133 The statute provides that “[a] telecommunications carrier shall 
be treated as a common carrier under this [Act] only to the extent that it is 
engaged in providing telecommunications services.” 134  On six separate 
occasions since 1998, the FCC has reiterated that broadband access is an 
“information service,” a category that is mutually exclusive with 
“telecommunications service.”135 Unless the agency revisits this conclusion, 
this provision prevents the FCC from using section 706 to impose common 
carriage obligations on broadband access providers.136 In other words, the 
FCC cannot use section 706 to impose backdoor common carriage regulation 
on providers that are not subject to Title II.137  
This prohibition of common carriage represents the most significant 
obstacle to using section 706 to impose a blanket nondiscrimination 
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requirement. The court’s decision in Verizon offers guidance as to what 
constitutes common carriage. As an initial matter, the court held that 
“requiring broadband providers to serve all edge providers without 
‘unreasonable discrimination’” is the same thing as the common carriage 
requirement “compel[ling] those providers to hold themselves out ‘to serve 
the public indiscriminately.’”138 Furthermore, as the Verizon court noted, the 
FCC explicitly equated common carriage and the nondiscrimination rule 
imposed by the 2010 order when it told commenters to look to its common 
carriage precedents for guidance as to what forms of discrimination were 
reasonable. 139  Moreover, the 2010 Open Internet Order’s prohibition of 
unreasonable discrimination accommodated none of the flexibility and 
individualized bargaining needed to take the regulation outside of common 
carriage. Instead of signaling flexibility, the Order warned that “it is unlikely 
that pay for priority would satisfy the ‘no unreasonable discrimination’ 
standard.”140 Preventing “broadband providers from charging edge providers 
for using their service” in effect would have “forc[ed] them to sell service to 
all who ask at a price of $0.” 141  The prohibition of unreasonable 
discrimination would thus have admitted none of the individualized 
bargaining that the court had previously found necessary to take a restriction 
outside the realm of common carriage.142 
In fact, even common carriers typically enjoy the ability to offer 
different classes of service and to charge different amounts for them. In one 
extreme case, AT&T created a separate class of service for a single customer; 
the FCC’s attempt to prevent AT&T from doing so was overturned in the 
courts.143  Ironically, in declaring prioritized service to be presumptively 
invalid, the nondiscrimination rule in the Open Internet Order would have 
forbidden a practice that common carriage would have explicitly 
permitted.144 
At the same time, the Verizon court distinguished the Order’s 
nondiscrimination rule from the data roaming rule that the D.C. Circuit 
upheld in Cellco Partnership v. FCC.145 As the Verizon court noted, the rule 
at issue in Cellco required only that mobile telephone companies enter into 
data roaming agreements on “commercially reasonable” terms, with 
reasonableness determined by the “totality of the circumstances” governed 
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by sixteen nonexclusive factors.146 These rules left “substantial room for 
individualized bargaining and discrimination in terms” and “expressly 
permit[ted] providers to adapt roaming agreements to ‘individualized 
circumstances without having to hold themselves out to serve all comers 
indiscriminately on the same or standardized terms.’”147 Moreover, the order 
at issue in Cellco contained language expressly indicating that its standard 
differed from the nondiscrimination standard applied to common carriers.148 
The Cellco court warned that if the FCC were to apply the “commercially 
reasonable” standard in a way that was tantamount to common carriage, it 
would likely be invalidated in as-applied challenges.149 
It is hard to see how the FCC could implement a blanket 
nondiscrimination rule and still provide the “substantial room for 
individualized bargaining and discrimination in terms” and the ability to 
“adapt roaming agreements to ‘individualized circumstances without having 
to hold themselves out to serve all comers indiscriminately on the same or 
standardized terms’” required to be a proper exercise of section 706 authority 
that does not constitute common carriage.150 Both Cellco and the tradition of 
common carriage afford providers the latitude to create individualized 
bargains and different classes of service. But permitting different classes of 
service with different prices is precisely what the nondiscrimination rule was 
designed to foreclose.151 
C. Commercial Reasonableness as an Alternative Standard 
That said, a nondiscrimination rule is not the only way for the FCC to 
address concerns that broadband access providers might restrict access to 
their networks in ways that would inhibit future broadband deployment. The 
D.C. Circuit’s Cellco decision, holding that the FCC’s data roaming rules 
did not constitute common carriage, and the court’s careful distinction of 
Cellco in Verizon v. FCC offered a clear blueprint for fashioning such a rule 
based on commercial reasonableness. Indeed, the law employs the 
commercial reasonableness standard in a wide range of contractual 
agreements.152  
                                                                                                                          
 146. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 652, 657. 
 147. Id. at 652 (alteration in original). 
 148. Id. at 656.  
 149. Id. at 652; see Cellco, 700 F.3d at 548–59. 
 150. Cellco, 700 F.3d at 548 (citing Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of 
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, 
Second Report and Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, 5433 para. 45 (2011)). 
 151. See 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 2, at 17947 para. 76. 
 152. See, e.g., Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 414, 430 (N.D.W. Va. 2012) 
(applying a commercial reasonableness standard to the concept of unconscionability); David 
B. Pursell, Commercial Reasonableness: The New Target, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, 
Mar.-Apr. 2011, at 69 (applying a commercial reasonableness standard within the context of 
health care contracts). 
438 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 66 
 
 
The FCC’s new rules proposed in its 2014 Open Internet NPRM 
appear to accept that invitation by embracing commercial reasonableness as 
the basis for a rule and proposing a totality-of-the-circumstances test guided 
by six nonexclusive factors plus a catchall:153 
 
 Impact on present and future competition; 
 Impact on consumers; 
 Impact on speech and civic engagement; 
 Technical characteristics; 
 “Good faith” negotiation; 
 Industry practices; and 
 Other factors.154 
 
If properly applied, such a rule could address the FCC’s desire to promote 
innovation, competition, free expression, and investment in infrastructure 
without imposing the type of mandatory obligations associated with common 
carriage.155 
1. Impact on Competition 
Consider, for example, the factor focusing on the impact on 
competition. As noted earlier, the literature on GPTs recognizes that strategic 
alliances between content and network providers can enhance 
competition.156  This is consistent with one of the major findings of the 
modern academic literature on competition policy: that vertical integration 
and exclusivity contracts are often procompetitive in a broad range of 
circumstances157 and that these practices can harm competition only when 
practiced by a firm with significant market share.158 
This factor would permit firms to engage in individualized bargaining 
and prioritized service when the relevant firms are too small to plausibly 
harm competition or when strategic alliances are likely to promote 
competition. A prime example of when such practices are unlikely to harm 
competition is the MetroPCS case discussed at greater length below. 159 
Simply put, at 3% market share, any practice adopted by MetroPCS was 
unlikely to harm competition, and any practice that enhanced its ability to 
compete with the market leaders despite its severe disadvantage in spectrum 
holdings could only enhance competition. Permitting similarly situated firms 
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not to carry the content of certain providers under these circumstances helps 
take this rule outside the realm of obligatory carriage associated with 
common carriage. 
2. Impact on Consumers 
Focusing on consumer welfare provides another way that the FCC’s 
proposed rule may fall short of mandating carriage of all content on equal 
terms. For example, some consumers place a greater emphasis on cost than 
flexibility. Indeed, this cost sensitivity explains the continued popularity of 
feature phones, which support only a handful of highly popular functions 
through a proprietary operating system that supports only a narrow range of 
third-party applications.160 
Moreover, as I noted nearly a decade ago, the fact that different 
customers use the network differently provides an opportunity to enhance 
consumer welfare through network diversity. 161  Most customers 
disproportionately frequent only a handful of locations.162  Consequently, 
they may prefer a network that gives them prioritized access to the locations 
that they use the most frequently and on which they place the highest value, 
such as email servers, remote desktop access to their office computers, or 
their cloud service providers.163 
Indeed, recent developments in the United Kingdom illustrate this 
dynamic nicely. Plusnet employs application-specific traffic management 
that prioritizes VoIP and gaming. 164  O2 prioritizes a different cluster of 
services, including streaming and gaming. 165  Sky offers an unmanaged 
network as a selling point.166 Rather than offering me-too services, these 
ISPs offer differentiated services designed to deliver a high-value product to 
customers with strong preferences for particular applications. Indeed, the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating: the ISP that manages its network most 
heavily, Plusnet, enjoys the highest customer satisfaction ratings in the 
UK.167 
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Focusing on consumer welfare thus provides another way that the 
commercial reasonableness standard can deviate from the nondiscrimination 
mandate associated with common carriage. These examples underscore how 
differentiation of traffic can provide consumer benefits by giving the 
increasingly heterogeneous universe of consumers a broader array of options 
from which to choose. 
3. Industry Practices 
Another way in which the commercial reasonableness standard can 
deviate from common carriage and still take horizontal fairness 
considerations into account is by examining industry practices. This factor 
requires an examination of similar transactions with other industry 
participants, while affording a degree of latitude for variations based on 
individualized considerations. 
An examination of industry practices reveals that many basic services, 
including VoIP, IP video, and voice over LTE, depend on prioritization or 
reserved bandwidth to provide the quality of service that consumers demand. 
The prevalence of these industry practices should be taken into account when 
assessing the commercial reasonableness of similar arrangements and when 
implementing the proposed exception for specialized services. Any concerns 
about whether the growth of specialized services might starve the best-efforts 
Internet of bandwidth are best addressed through the minimum quality 
standards established by the anti-blocking rule. 
IV. TITLE II RECLASSIFICATION 
Many network neutrality proponents regard the Verizon court’s 
prohibition on using section 706 to impose common carriage obligations as 
an insuperable barrier to the type of nondiscrimination mandate that they 
regard as the most critical.168 These advocates believe that the only way to 
achieve a blanket nondiscrimination mandate would be to reclassify 
broadband access services under Title II, thereby enabling the FCC to impose 
common carriage regulation.169 However, the FCC has repeatedly ruled that 
broadband access services are information services that are exempt from 
common carriage regulation, rather than telecommunications services that 
are subject to common carriage regulations.170 The Supreme Court upheld 
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this determination as a reasonable interpretation of the Communications Act 
in Brand X.171 The FCC floated the possibility of reclassifying broadband 
access as a Title II service while considering the Open Internet Order, relying 
exclusively on Justice Scalia’s dissent in Brand X.172 The agency ultimately 
declined to pursue reclassification, but made it a point to leave the Title II 
option open.173  
A. Legal Barriers to Reclassification 
I have addressed at length the problems with Title II reclassification 
elsewhere and will only sketch my objections here. The FCC’s construction 
of the statute is subject to Chevron deference. As Brand X made clear, 
Chevron does not preclude the FCC from changing its mind so long as it 
justifies its change in position.174 The fact that the FCC has ruled on six 
separate occasions that broadband access is an information service and not a 
telecommunications service does not prevent it from revisiting that decision. 
To say that the agency may reevaluate its construction, however, does 
not relieve it from satisfying Chevron’s standard of review. Chevron Step 
one requires that the statute’s text not foreclose the proffered construction of 
the statute.175 If Congress has directly addressed the issue, congressional 
intent controls. 176  The language of the statute forecloses classifying 
broadband access as a telecommunications service. The statute defines a 
“telecommunications service” as a provider that offers for a fee directly to 
the public “the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, 
of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content 
of the information as sent and received.”177 The FCC has characterized this 
as “pure” transmission that does not involve computer processing or 
storage.178  
The problem is that much of the world’s web content is served by 
content delivery networks (“CDNs”), which store popular web content in 
thousands of locations around the world. For example, market leader Akamai 
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uses nearly 150,000 servers throughout the network to serve 30% of the 
world’s web content and rely on the domain name system (“DNS”) to 
determine from which cache it should serve any particular request.179 The 
Supreme Court has upheld the conclusion that the DNS and caching 
functions associated with the typical broadband access service inevitably 
involve both computer processing and storage and thus take broadband 
access outside the scope of Title II.180  
The statutory requirement that the transmission take place between 
points specified by the end user is even more problematic. On the Internet, 
physical locations are addressed by the numbers of an Internet Protocol (IP) 
address, which in the case of IP version 4 is usually represented by four 
numbers between 0 and 255 separated by dots (such as 128.91.34.233, which 
is one of the IP addresses assigned to the University of Pennsylvania).181 
Although the National Science Foundation is currently studying a proposal 
to restructure Internet addresses so that they refer to particular content rather 
than particular locations,182 until such a proposal is adopted, the address 
architecture will continue to focus on physical addresses. End users and 
applications typically do not rely on IP addresses, however. Instead, they 
generally use domain names (such as upenn.edu) to access Internet 
resources, relying on the DNS to map domain names onto IP addresses.183 
When this is the case, the points of communication are specified by DNS, 
not the end user. 184  Moreover, as anyone who has attempted to access 
Google’s website from another country recognizes, the mapping of domain 
names onto IP addresses is not simply mechanical.185 On the contrary, the 
DNS often routes the same domain name to different locations based on its 
inference of which location is most likely to be the one the end user wants. 
In addition, content is frequently not stored in a single location.186 CDNs, for 
instance, depend on the DNS to determine from which of their thousands of 
caches that any particular request should be served.187 Thus, unless the user 
employs IP addresses instead of domain names or maintains his or her own 
DNS, it is a third-party DNS provider that selects the points of transmission, 
not the end user. As a result, it is impossible to see how broadband access 
can fit within the statutory definition of telecommunications service 
governed by Title II. 
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B. Overlooked Implications of Reclassification 
Interestingly, many network neutrality proponents seem to be 
unfamiliar with the way that Title II regulation works in practice. 
Specifically, it has generally not been applied to benefit actors occupying the 
position of content and service providers, it has never barred prioritized 
service, and it has long been plagued by a series of implementation 
difficulties. 
1. Common Carriage’s Inapplicability to 
Complementary Services 
Supporters of Title II reclassification believe it will enable rules that 
give edge providers nondiscriminatory access to broadband networks. The 
history of common carriage is to the contrary. The seminal decision is 
Memphis & Little Rock Railroad Co. v Southern Express Co. (The Express 
Package Cases), in which the Supreme Court held that the nondiscrimination 
obligations of common carriers applied only to end users and did not apply 
to express package companies who wanted to use the railroad as a conduit 
for delivering another service.188 This is because the specialized needs of 
such services “must necessarily be a matter of bargain,” the Court reasoned, 
and thus cannot always be provided to all express package companies.189 The 
fact that express package services had become a “public necessity,” was 
“used in almost every conceivable way, and for almost every conceivable 
purpose,” and that “[a]ll have become accustomed to it, and it cannot be 
taken away without breaking up many of the long-settled habits of business, 
and interfering materially with the conveniences of social life” did not 
change the Court’s analysis.190 The courts have applied similar principles to 
the telecommunications industry.191 
The Verizon court elided this distinction somewhat when it rejected 
the FCC’s argument that the nondiscrimination rule’s requirement that 
broadband access providers carry edge providers did not impose common 
carriage obligations because broadband access providers only served as 
carriers for end users, not for edge providers. 192  The issue presents the 
converse of the question presented in the Express Package Cases. In those 
cases, the question was whether common carriage entailed 
nondiscrimination towards edge providers. 193  In Verizon, the issue was 
whether nondiscrimination towards edge providers entailed common 
carriage. 
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In any event, the history of common carriage raises questions whether 
common carriage would give edge providers the benefit of a 
nondiscrimination mandate. If not, Title II reclassification would not create 
the benefits that many network neutrality proponents envisage. 
2. The Permissibility of Prioritized Service 
As noted above, common carriage does not restrict from creating 
different classes of service so long as it provides each class of service to all 
comers. 194  Thus, notwithstanding the claims of some network neutrality 
proponents, Title II reclassification would not necessarily prevent broadband 
access providers from offering premium services at premium prices.195 
3. Difficulties Implementing Common Carriage 
Finally, advocates of Title II reclassification must come to grips with 
how difficult nondiscrimination mandates have historically been to 
implement in practice. Any decision-maker confronted with a 
nondiscrimination claim would have to determine whether the price 
differentials were the result of differences in quality or cost or the desire to 
implement schemes such a Ramsey pricing that can make the allocation of 
high fixed costs goods more efficient.196 
Title II would also require decision-makers to ensure that rates are just 
and reasonable.197 The methodologies for evaluating the reasonableness of 
rates have long been criticized for providing insufficient incentives to 
economize on costs, discouraging innovation, and leading to interminable 
controversies over how to determine the proper rate base and rate of return, 
how to allocate common costs, and over the reasonableness of non-price 
terms and conditions.198 Rate regulation also facilitates collusion by creating 
entry barriers, standardizing products and pricing, pooling information, 
providing advance notice of changes, and allowing the government to serve 
as the means for forcing parties to adhere to the agreed upon prices.199 
Moreover, with respect to traditional telephony, the increasingly specialized 
needs of business customers led them to request an ever-growing number of 
special access tariffs and waivers designed to tailor services to individual 
customers’ particular needs. In light of the growing diversity of Internet 
applications, imposition of Title II regulation would likely deluge regulators 
with a similar range of requests. 
                                                                                                                          
 194. See supra notes 194–207 and accompanying text. 
 195. Yoo, supra note 53, at 574 n.183. 
 196. Id. at 573–81. 
 197. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). 
 198. Yoo, supra note 53, at 581–95. 
 199. Id. at 602–05. 
Issue 3 WICKARD FOR THE INTERNET? 445 
 
4. Difficulties Implementing Forbearance 
Finally, any solution based on Title II reclassification would require 
the FCC to forbear from a number of statutory provisions, as both the 
Commission 200  and several advocates of reclassification have noted. 201 
Section 10 of the Communications Act requires the FCC to forbear from 
“applying any regulation or any provision of [Title II] to a 
telecommunications carrier” if the agency finds that a regulation is not 
needed to protect consumers or ensure just and reasonable practices and that 
forbearing from such regulation is “consistent with the public interest.”202 In 
practice, however, the agency’s experience with forbearance has not been a 
happy one. Scholars have criticized the agency for failing to establish clear 
evidentiary standards, 203  for establishing a market power test based on 
marginal cost pricing that is impossible for any telecommunications network 
to satisfy,204 and for ignoring intermodal competition.205 Indeed, the courts 
have found the FCC’s forbearance decisions to be so internally inconsistent 
as to be arbitrary and capricious.206 
The net result of these considerations is that Title II reclassification 
may not prohibit the types of practices that concern network neutrality 
proponents the most. In addition, the looming implementation difficulties 
suggest that even if common carriage regulation were somehow directed 
towards those exact practices, it may not create the benefits that they 
envisage. And the prospect of relying on forbearance to ensure that 
regulation remains light may be illusory. 
V. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE VERIZON DECISION 
Both Verizon and the FCC declined to appeal the Verizon court’s 
decision to the Supreme Court, and the FCC has already published a new 
notice of proposed rulemaking that proposes rules that comport with the 
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Verizon decision.207 Nonetheless, the text of the Verizon decision and the 
early debates surrounding the FCC’s proposed rules raise some tantalizing 
possibilities as to what might transpire next. 
A. State Regulation 
Section 706 applies equally to “[t]he Commission and each State 
commission with regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications 
services.” 208  The statute thus seems to accord to state public utility 
commissions (PUCs) the same regulatory authority that it accords to the 
FCC. Concerns that inconsistent state regulation would disrupt the 
deployment of the newly emerging information services led the FCC to 
preempt state regulation in both its Second and Third Computer Inquiries.209 
History has shown that state and local authorities might well be eager to 
exercise this authority. Prior to 2002, when the FCC refused to address the 
regulatory status of broadband access services, 210  state and local 
governments rushed to the void.211 The resulting regulation and litigation 
threatened the broadband industry with a welter of inconsistent and 
burdensome regulatory mandates. The FCC’s 2002 assertion of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over broadband largely eliminated these disputes.212  
The obvious way to avoid the inconsistency of concurrent state-federal 
regulation is for the FCC to preempt state action, but it is questionable 
whether preemption is permissible when section 706(a) also gives authority 
to the state PUCs in pari materia.213 Indeed, the Verizon court saw nothing 
untoward in concurrent federal-state jurisdiction.214 
Language included in both the Senate and Conference Reports 
accompanying the 1996 Act may provide sufficient basis to avoid this 
problem. The Senate report clearly provides that “[t]he FCC may pre-empt 
State commissions if they fail to act to ensure reasonable and timely 
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access.” 215  The Conference Report includes identical language. 216  The 
legislative history thus clearly suggests that the federal government should 
be able to preempt state regulation notwithstanding the language of section 
706(a). 
B. The Applicability of Network Neutrality to Interconnection 
Agreements 
Both the 2010 Open Internet Order and the 2014 Open Internet Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking made clear that the rules were designed to ensure 
equal treatment of traffic within a broadband access provider’s network. The 
rules were not meant to equalize the terms under which traffic arrives at a 
broadband provider’s network.  
As a result, the FCC has repeatedly clarified that the Open Internet 
rules do not apply to interconnection agreements between Internet service 
providers (ISPs). 217  Some voices have begun to call for bringing 
interconnection agreements within the scope of the network neutrality 
debate. 
Attempting to equilibrate interconnection agreements would turn 
every bilateral negotiation between two ISPs into a regulatory matter. 
Indeed, in a network comprised of more than 30,000 networks 
interconnected through bilateral agreements, variations in price and latency 
are endemic. 
1. The Mischaracterization of Peering as Zero-
Price Interconnection 
It is often said that the Internet is a network of networks.218 What this 
means in practice is that traffic that originates on one network often 
terminates on another network.219 To make this possible, ISPs enter into 
contracts with other Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to exchange traffic. 
Because the terminating ISP also incurs costs,220 the traditional rule was that 
the originating ISP would make what is known as a transit payment to 
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compensate the terminating ISP for providing services to the originating 
ISP’s customers.221  
If traffic is roughly symmetrical, ISPs can reduce costs by foregoing 
monitoring and billing for the exchange of traffic and instead calling it a 
wash, a practice commonly known as settlement-free peering. 222  Such 
arrangements make economic sense only if the traffic exchanged is 
symmetrical in terms of cost and value. If traffic becomes out of ratio, 
peering contracts typically call for transit-style payments.223  
The fact that peering agreements include a symmetry requirement 
underscores that they are more properly regarded as a form of barter that is 
conditional on an even exchange.224 Consider what would happen if one of 
the parties to a peering contract that was roughly in balance suddenly signed 
up a customer that caused a significant increase in the amount of traffic that 
it was handing off to the other party for termination. At this point, the traffic 
would likely be out of ratio, in which case the terminating ISP would have 
to incur significant costs to terminate the traffic and the peering contract 
would typically call for the originating ISP to make a payment to the 
terminating ISP. Insisting that all interconnection occur at a zero price 
regardless of the amount of traffic is inconsistent with the barter-based 
justification underlying peering arrangements.  
Certainly, the originating ISP would like the terminating ISP to bear 
all of the costs of doing so. Conversely, the terminating ISP would like the 
originating ISP to pay for the costs, as required by the typical peering 
contract. Both parties benefit from delivering greater value to the end users. 
The usual solution would be for both parties to bear part of the costs based 
on their relative elasticities of demand. 225  Mandating zero-price 
interconnection would prevent this from occurring. 
2. The Multiple Functions Performed by Prices 
Insisting that interconnection always occur at a zero price would also 
ignore the important role that prices play in any market economy. In terms 
of Internet interconnection, prices perform three key functions.  
First, prices allocate scarce resources and allow markets to clear while 
helping to ensure that those resources are employed only when the benefits 
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of doing so exceed the costs. 226  Second, they provide an incentive for 
interconnection partners to conserve on bandwidth. Third, if 
supracompetitive prices emerge, they signal to other actors that the market 
is in short-run disequilibrium and provide the incentive for others to enter 
the market. Entry by other players shifts the supply curve out until the market 
is once again in long-run equilibrium.227 
Imagine what would happen if all interconnection prices were required 
to equal zero. First, because prices could not rise, markets could not clear, so 
they would end up in persistent shortage.228 Second, interconnection partners 
would have no incentive to rationalize their consumption or to invest in 
technologies that consume less bandwidth.229 Third, and worst of all, zero-
price interconnection would prevent those who invest in value-creating 
activities from earning a return and thus risk inhibiting innovation.230 
Internet companies are investing in their businesses in an attempt to 
gain an edge on the competition, and any advantage gained only serves to 
force competitors to make new investments of their own. Consider the 
impact that the cable industry’s deployment of DOCSIS 3.0231 and the advent 
of Google Fiber 232  have had on telephone companies. The higher 
investments by these companies are forcing AT&T to respond in kind. 233 
Faced with competitors able to deliver significantly higher bandwidth, 
AT&T has begun deploying more advanced DSL technologies capable of 
delivering between 45–100 Mbps service.234 Where these services have been 
                                                                                                                          
 226. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1847, 1864 (2006). 
 227. Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1579, 1590–91 (2003).  
 228. See, e.g., DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND LAW 78–83 (2009) (discussing the harmful 
economic consequences of price controls). 
 229. See Yoo, supra note 226, at 1864–65. 
 230. See Yoo, supra note 161, at 48–53; Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, 
Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 235–37 [hereinafter Yoo, 
Consumers]. 
 231. See Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 68, at 10385 para. 92.  
 232. See John Brodkin, Google Fiber Chooses Nine Metro Areas for Possible Expansion, 
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 19, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/ 
02/google-fiber-chooses-nine-metro-areas-for-possible-expansion/. 
 233. See, e.g., Applications and Public Interest Statement of Comcast Corp. and Time 
Warner Cable Inc. at 42–52, Applications of Comcast Corp. and Time Warner Cable Inc. for 
Consent to Assign and Transfer Control of Licenses and Other Authorizations, FCC MB 
Docket No. 14-57 (rel. July 10, 2014), available at http://corporate.comcast.com/ 
images/Comcast-Public-Interest-Statement-April-8.pdf (chronicling the virtuous cycle of 
investment by cable and telco broadband providers in infrastructure upgrades including FTTN 
and VDSL2 with pair bonding). 
 234. Press Release, AT&T, AT&T to Invest $14 Billion to Significantly Expand 
Wireless and Wireline Broadband Networks, Support Future IP Data Growth and New 
Services (Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=23506&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=35661&mapcode=. 
450 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 66 
 
 
deployed, AT&T is successfully taking customers from the cable companies 
with which it competes.235 
This type of dynamic is not limited to horizontal competition. Service 
providers are providing high-value content and services with strong 
customer appeal. The desirability of these products in turn strengthens these 
companies’ hand when negotiating interconnection agreements. 
Indeed, this is exactly what appears to be occurring with Netflix. 
Netflix has been a spectacular success, largely because of the billions of 
dollars in forward contracts in content that it has undertaken.236 These risks 
have paid off spectacularly, and Netflix has grown to more than one-third of 
all primetime Internet traffic in the U.S.237 Like any for-profit company, 
Netflix would prefer it if the ISPs bore as much of the burden of the 
additional costs of carrying this traffic as possible. Indeed, that is the gist of 
its Open Connect program, which requires ISPs to terminate Netflix traffic 
for free.238 The strong bargaining leverage created by Netflix’s investments 
has led many ISPs to embrace Open Connect.239  
Netflix must be permitted to exercise the bargaining power created by 
its investments if it is to be expected to continue to invest in the future. Other 
ISPs have resisted and have made investments of their own in an attempt to 
gain bargaining leverage.240 This pattern of move and countermove in an 
attempt to reap economic benefit is what drives investment and innovation. 
This is the true virtuous circle of innovation.  
All of this is a natural part of healthy bargaining process. As in the 
typical case, both sides reached an interconnection agreement that divides 
the costs. Applying network neutrality to such disputes would turn every 
garden-variety bargain over price that characterizes every arms-length 
economic transaction into a regulatory matter. To the extent that it deprives 
firms of returns that are the result of the entrepreneurial risks they have taken, 
it threatens to cause the virtuous circle to stall. Determining the price that 
appropriately divides the costs is greatly complicated by the fact that the 
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Internet constitutes a two-sided market. 241  The economics of two-sided 
markets are somewhat complex. 242  Conventional economics has long 
recognized the existence of “network economic effects,” which cause a 
network to increase in value as the number of users connected to it 
increases.243 To use a classic example, the value of a telephone network to 
consumers is thus determined by more than just the price charged and the 
services provided, as is the case with most goods. It also depends on the 
number of other subscribers connected to the network. The more people each 
user can reach through the network, the more valuable it becomes to all users. 
The telephone system is an example of a one-sided market, as the value 
to any particular caller is determined in no small part by the number of 
similarly situated callers. When a market is two-sided, instead of bringing 
together a single class of similarly situated users, networks bring together 
two completely different classes of users.244  In those cases, the value is 
determined not by the number of users of the same class, but rather the 
number of users of the other class. To put it in terms of a concrete example, 
consider the economics of broadcast television, which generates revenue 
from advertisers based on the number of viewers the industry can deliver.245 
The value of the network for advertisers is not determined by the number of 
other advertisers. Instead, the value of the network increases with the number 
of a different class of network participants (i.e., television viewers). 
The economics of two-sided markets indicate that it may be socially 
beneficial for content and application providers to subsidize the prices paid 
by end users.246 The fact that the Internet has become increasingly dominated 
by advertising revenue paid to content and application providers rather than 
network providers makes this particularly likely to be true. An advertiser’s 
willingness to pay for an ad on any particular website depends on the number 
of end users viewing that website. Under these circumstances, the optimal 
solution may be for the website owner to subsidize the total number of end 
users by making payments to the network provider to help defray their costs 
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of connection.247 The costs of subsidizing more users would be more than 
offset by the additional revenue generated by the fact that advertisers can 
now reach more potential customers.248 
These revenue-side pressures are reinforced by cost-side 
considerations. The cost of connecting content and application providers to 
the Internet is quite low, typically only requiring a single high-speed line to 
a small number of business locations.249 The cost of connecting end users to 
the Internet is much higher, requiring the wiring and upgrading of equipment 
in entire neighborhoods. In an industry in which the primary revenue is 
flowing to content and application providers and the costs involved in 
connecting content and application providers are much smaller than the costs 
of connecting end users, one would expect some cash to flow from content 
and application providers to those who are providing connections to end 
users.250 
These dynamics are again well-illustrated by broadcast television. In 
many ways, broadcast television and the Internet are analogous. The movie 
studios that create television programs play a similar role to content and 
application providers. Television networks aggregate programs and deliver 
them nationally in much the same manner as server-side network providers 
and backbone providers. 251  Local broadcast stations provide last-mile 
connectivity that is quite similar to the role played by DSL and cable modem 
providers. In addition, the revenue structure is quite comparable, in that 
television networks receive advertising revenue in much the same manner as 
content and application providers. Furthermore, the cost structure is 
somewhat similar in that connecting individual homes is much more costly 
than distributing programming nationally. 
For decades, the standard business arrangement has been for television 
networks to subsidize the operations of local broadcast stations by paying 
them to be members of their television networks.252 The industry’s revenue 
and cost structure make such arrangements quite logical. The cost of paying 
these broadcast stations to affiliate with a network is more than offset by the 
increase in advertising revenue made possible by the fact that the network is 
now able to reach a larger audience.253 Broadcast television thus represents 
a prime example of when firms operating on one side of the market find it 
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economically beneficial to subsidize end users on the other side of the 
market. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the affiliation fees that the networks 
pay to broadcast stations is anything but uniform. The precise amount paid 
varies with the relative strength of the network and the relative strength of 
the broadcast station. 254  Stronger broadcast stations receive more, while 
weaker ones receive less. Equally interesting is the fact that in recent years, 
the cash flow has begun to vary in its direction as well as magnitude, with 
weaker stations having to pay rather than be paid to be part of the television 
network.255 The dynamic nature of this pricing regime benefits consumers by 
providing incentives for networks to invest in better quality programming 
and by providing an incentive for stations to provide better carriage.  
The core insight of two-sided market is that prices can vary widely in 
magnitude and direction. Sometimes money flows from content providers to 
network providers, and sometimes it naturally flows the other way. All of 
this underscores the difficulty of identifying the optimal price as well as the 
fact that requiring all interconnection occur at a zero price would be an 
economic anomaly. Prices are how market-based economies allocate goods, 
provide incentives to minimize costs, and signal producers that the market is 
in disequilibrium. Freezing those prices would dampen those signals and risk 
forestalling the quest for bargaining leverage that is the engine that drives 
the virtuous circle of innovation forward. 
3. The Danger of Regulating Interconnection 
Agreements 
Although some have suggested that such interconnection agreements 
represent network neutrality violations,256 network neutrality only applies to 
how traffic is handled within an ISP’s network. It does not apply to how the 
traffic arrives at an ISP, which inevitably travels by paths of different lengths 
and incurs different costs as it traverses a system composed of 47,000 
separate networks tied together through arms-length interconnection 
agreements. Indeed, this is why the Open Internet Order specified that it does 
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not apply to interconnection agreements, 257  why FCC Chairman Julius 
Genachowski made clear that the Open Internet Order does not apply to 
interconnection disputes,258 and why Chairman Wheeler has indicated the 
same. 259  The proposed rule that the FCC adopted on May 15, 2014, 
tentatively reiterated the conclusion that the rules would apply only to a 
broadband access provider’s own network and not to traffic exchanged 
between networks.260 
The Comcast-Netflix interconnection agreement appears to be nothing 
more than a typical case of such bargaining. One advantage is that because 
it now is a direct customer of Comcast, it gains the benefit of the guaranteed 
service levels in Comcast’s standard service-level agreement. Indeed, media 
reports indicate that Comcast customers are experiencing a quality 
enhancement in their Netflix experience.261 
The agreement reduces Comcast’s costs, while the impact on Netflix 
is ambiguous: while it now must pay Comcast to terminate its traffic, it no 
longer needs to pay the third-party ISP on which it previously relied to reach 
Comcast in a classic case of efficiencies through cutting out the middleman. 
Although some have suggested that this might lead to a net reduction in 
Netflix’s costs, that information is confidential and cannot be verified. In any 
event, interconnection represents a trivial revenue stream for Comcast and a 
tiny portion of Netflix’s cost structure, which is dominated by program 
acquisition costs, which means that the transaction is unlikely to have any 
material effect on Netflix subscription prices.262  
In addition, interconnection in the Internet space is fundamentally 
different from carriage agreements in cable television. In cable television, 
the failure to come to an agreement means that subscribers cannot receive 
                                                                                                                          
 257. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 2, at 17933 para. 47 (noting the Open Internet 
Order’s inapplicability to “Internet backbone services”); id. at 17944 n.209 (noting the Open 
Internet Order’s inapplicability to interconnection).  
 258. Network Neutrality and Internet Regulation: Warranted or More Economic Harm 
than Good?, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Communications and Technology, H. Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65940/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg65940.pdf. 
 259. Brendan Sasso, Netflix’s Net-Neutrality Plea Gets Rejected by the FCC, NAT’L J. 
(Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/netflix-s-net-neutrality-plea-gets-
rejected-by-the-fcc-20140401.  
 260. 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 7, at 5617 para. 59. 
 261. See, e.g., Chloe Albanesius, Netflix Speeds Jump 65 Percent on Comcast After Deal, 
PC MAG. (Apr. 14, 2014, 5:37 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/ 
0,2817,2456553,00.asp.  
 262. Dan Rayburn, Here’s How the Comcast & Netflix Deal Is Structured, with Data & 
Numbers, STREAMING MEDIA BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014, 12:14 PM), 
http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2014/02/heres-comcast-netflix-deal-structured-
numbers.html; Joan E. Solsman, Netflix vs. the Comcast-TWC Merger: Nothing to Lose, 
CNET (Apr. 22, 2014, 5:54 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/netflix-a-comcast-merger-
nemesis-of-convenience/. 
Issue 3 WICKARD FOR THE INTERNET? 455 
 
particular content.263 With respect to the Internet, multiple ways to reach 
consumers always exist. In fact, Comcast maintains 40 settlement-free 
peering relationships and over 8,000 paid transit relationships.264 That means 
that edge providers will always have some way to reach Comcast customers 
even if they are unable to reach a direct interconnection agreement.265 The 
only bargaining advantage that Comcast would enjoy is the different between 
the interconnection terms and the cost of Netflix’s next-best interconnection 
option.266 Although some have speculated that Comcast might still be able to 
discriminate against Netflix traffic flowing over other paths, that traffic is 
mixed with the traffic of other end users, which would require Comcast to 
inspect all of the traffic coming through that connection,267 which would be 
unrealistic and prohibited by Comcast’s commitment to abide by the terms 
of the Open Internet Order.268 
As an added benefit, absent the interconnection agreement, all of 
Comcast’s customers would have had to bear the costs of Netflix’s increase 
in traffic regardless if they used the service or not. The interconnection 
agreement promotes fairness by ensuring that those who derive the benefits 
are the ones who bear the costs. The elimination of zero-cost pricing also 
avoids the problems that arise when edge providers have no incentive to 
economize on the volume of traffic they send, as well as address the legal 
concerns raised by Judge David Tatel in his decision in Verizon v. FCC.269 
Any remaining concerns should be eliminated by the fact that Comcast 
has committed to abide by the terms of the FCC’s Open Internet Order even 
                                                                                                                          
 263. For instance, in early 2014, after Viacom failed to reach a deal with Cable One, a 
small cable company, subscribers lost access to all Viacom channels, including Comedy 
Central and MTV. Alex Ben  Block, Viacom Blackout Continues as Small Cable Company 
Takes Stand in Retrans Fight, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 2, 2014, 5:06 PM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/viacom-blackout-continues-as-small-693143. 
 264. Competition in the Video and Broadband Markets: The Proposed Merger of 
Comcast and Time Warner Cable:  Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (May 
8, 2014) (Joint Written Statement of David L. Cohen, Executive Vice President, Comcast 
Corp., and Robert D. Marcus, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Time Warner Cable), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=E55CD2D5-C965-4D7B-
84E0-BFD386769F2C. 
 265. Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture That Challenge the 
Status Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 86 (2010). 
 266. Stanley M. Besen et al., Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering 
Agreements, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 292, 295 (2001). 
 267. Cf. Timothy B. Lee, The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality Without 
Regulation 15–23 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 626, 2008), available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-626.pdf (arguing that ISP efforts to 
degrade or discriminate against disfavored Internet traffic are unlikely to succeed for technical 
and economic reasons). 
 268.  Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. & NBC Universal, Inc., 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4275 para. 94 (2011) [hereinafter 
Comcast-NBCU Order] (barring Comcast from discriminating against unaffiliated Internet 
traffic and requiring Comcast to abide by the rules contained in the 2010 Open Internet Order). 
 269. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
456 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 66 
 
 
though it was struck down by the courts.270 In fact, the merger would extend 
this benefit to all of Time Warner Cable’s customers as well. 
C. Case-by-Case Adjudication 
The Verizon court’s discussion of Cellco leaves open the possibility 
that the FCC could implement a regime based on case-by-case adjudication. 
Cellco upheld a requirement of commercial reasonableness in data roaming 
agreements as distinct from common carriage. There is much to recommend 
such an approach; indeed, I have advocated it for a long time.271  
There are some legal constraints to adjudication. Under Cellco, if the 
FCC imposes a nondiscrimination mandate on a case-by-case basis, it would 
be invalid. 272  Verizon echoed this concern. 273  So although case-by-case 
adjudication is a viable option, the FCC cannot use it as a backdoor means 
for mandating nondiscrimination. 
Ex post, case-by-case adjudication has a long legacy, with roots in the 
debate between rules and standards as well as the rejection of the codification 
movement during the Nineteenth Century.274 Indeed, the distinction between 
ex ante rules and ex post adjudication may be somewhat overstated, in that 
rules are never as clear and standards are never as vague as people suggest. 
Both have their place, with standards being the preferred form of the legal 
rule when the nature of the problem is contextual and variegated. 
As a policy matter, this regime should be exercised with great restraint. 
Content and applications are complements to broadband access. As such, 
contracts between content and applications providers and broadband access 
providers are properly regarded as vertical restraints. As a theoretical matter, 
the welfare implications of vertical restraints are ambiguous, as they may 
either benefit or harm consumers. 275  Economic theory suggests that 
consumer harm can arise only if the relevant markets are concentrated and 
protected by entry barriers; that is, if the participants have market power.276 
As noted above, the empirical literature indicates that vertical restraints are 
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either neutral or welfare enhancing in the vast majority of cases.277 Most 
importantly, case-by-case adjudication should be conducted based on 
empirical evidenced in the context of a concrete theory. Placing the burden 
of proof on the party challenging the practice will help promote 
experimentation with new products, services, and business models. 
1. MetroPCS/YouTube  
These facts counsel in favor of certain guidelines for case-by-case 
adjudication. First, we should impose a market-power screen to filter out 
cases unlikely to cause consumer harm. Contrary to the suggestion of the 
dissent in Verizon,278 this would be a significant deviation from common 
carriage, which has historically not required market power.279  
The point is illustrated by MetroPCS, which was the target of one of 
the first network neutrality complaints. MetroPCS is a regional wireless 
provider in the U.S.280 Its 8.1 million subscribers as of the end of 2010 made 
it the fifth-largest provider in the U.S., although its customer base was less 
than one-tenth that of market leaders Verizon and AT&T.281 It specializes in 
offering unlimited voice and text plans without long-term contracts and at 
monthly rates that are significantly lower than the prices charged by the top-
four national providers.282  
In the markets in which it operates, MetroPCS controls significantly 
less spectrum than its national rivals. In addition, unlike its national rivals, 
which provide broadband services through 3G platforms such as EV-DO and 
HSPA+, until September 2010 MetroPCS operated exclusively through a 
second-generation (“2G”) technology known as 1xRTT CDMA.283 Given its 
2G roots, its network is based on the Binary Runtime Environment for 
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Wireless (BREW) platform, which was designed primarily for text rather 
than multimedia.284 The inability to support popular video applications such 
a YouTube put MetroPCS at a competitive disadvantage. Because video 
delivered to mobile devices do not require the same resolution as full-sized 
television screens, MetroPCS was able to reduce the bandwidth needed by 
using Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) to compress the video signal so 
that it would work effectively on its 2G network.285 Its core 2G data plan was 
priced at $50 per month.286 
On September 21, 2010, MetroPCS skipped deploying 3G altogether 
and became the first provider to offer service using the 4G technology known 
as Long Term Evolution (LTE).287 Unable to offer service through a true 
smartphone, MetroPCS opted to deploy LTE through the Samsung Craft, a 
less expensive, but more limited device known as a feature phone that was 
able to support BREW.288 Providers of many popular applications, including 
Flash and other web plug-ins, did not regard the platform as sufficiently 
widespread to create BREW-compatible versions.289 MetroPCS was able to 
augment BREW to provide full-track music downloads and premium video 
content from NBC Universal, Black Entertainment Television, and 
Univision through its MetroSTUDIO service.290 In this way, MetroPCS was 
able to offer limited data offerings in markets in which it possessed only 10 
MHz of spectrum. 291  MetroPCS’s initial LTE deployments offered two 
service plans: $55 per month for unlimited voice text and data access and 
$60 per month for the same services plus MetroSTUDIO.292 The terms of 
service defining data access specified that it “may include, for example, 
multimedia steaming and video on demand services, as well as certain 
multimedia uploads, downloads and gaming services and applications” and 
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may exclude data sessions from MetroSTUDIO, with MetroPCS retaining 
the sole discretion to determine what constitutes data access.293 
On January 3, 2011, MetroPCS revised its 4G LTE service plans. It 
maintained its previous $60-per-month plan, while adding two lower-priced 
plans.294 Its $40-per-month plan offered unlimited talk, text, and 4G Web 
browsing with unlimited YouTube access.295 Its $50-per-month plan added 
additional features (international and premium text messaging, GPS, mobile 
instant messaging, corporate e-mail, caller identity screening, and 
MetroSTUDIO service via WiFi) as well as 1 GB of additional “data 
access.” 296  Its $60-per-month plan offered unlimited data access and 
MetroSTUDIO through any connection.297 
One week later, a group of advocacy groups—Free Press, Center for 
Media Justice, Media Access Project, New America Foundation, and 
Presente.org—submitted a letter calling for the FCC to investigate whether 
MetroPCS’s proposed service plans violated the FCC’s Open Internet 
Order.298 Their primary complaint was that MetroPCS’s $40 and $50 per 
month plans permitted unlimited access to YouTube, while potentially 
categorizing other voice and video services, such as Skype and Netflix, as 
data access subject to bandwidth limits. 299  Consumers Union followed 
eleven days later with a similar letter.300 
MetroPCS responded on February 14, 2011. It emphasized its long 
legacy of being the only provider to offer low cost, unlimited service plans 
without long-term contracts or requiring deposits or credit checks. It also 
noted that it has access to significantly less spectrum than its leading 
competitors: “As a consequence, MetroPCS had to innovate to make 
maximum use of its relatively limited spectrum resources.”301 In addition, 
device manufacturers were focused on more spectrum-intensive 
deployments planned by Verizon and AT&T  ̧which typically used 20 MHz 
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of spectrum, whereas MetroPCS needed to develop LTE service on as little 
as 1.4 MHz of spectrum.302 
Moreover, LTE adoptions were slowed by the fact that its initial $55-
per-month and $60-per-month LTE plans were priced higher than its 2G data 
plans. At the same time, the arrival of Android handsets was causing data 
traffic in its 2G network to increase. MetroPCS’s revised LTE plans were 
carefully designed to avoid having to invest capital to upgrade a 2G data 
network that was already in the process of becoming obsolete by 
encouraging wireless data users to migrate to the more spectrum-efficient 
LTE network without overburdening it in the process. 303  The primary 
mechanism for doing so was the $40-per-month LTE plan, which was 
cheaper than its $50-per-month 2G data plan.304 Because subscribers to the 
$50-per-month 2G data plan already had access to unlimited YouTube 
downloads, MetroPCS felt it had to include this functionality in its $40-per-
month LTE plan if it was to be able to encourage subscribers to migrate from 
2G to LTE. The fact that the $50-per-month LTE plan allowed subscribers 
to download up to 1 GB of multimedia streaming also made it more attractive 
than the identically priced 2G plan. MetroPCS emphasized that it facilitated 
access to YouTube in response to customer demand. It lacked any financial 
arrangements that provide it with any incentive to favor YouTube, and that 
no other YouTube competitors had ever sought access to the MetroPCS 
network.305 
As an initial matter, it is hard to see how any policy implemented by a 
firm of MetroPCS’s size could hurt consumers or competition. It had less 
than 3% of all U.S. wireless subscribers as of the end of 2010.306 In an era 
where creating greater competition in wireless networks remains a major 
policy goal,307 network management remains an important tool for firms like 
MetroPCS to deploy competitive services notwithstanding the dearth of 
spectrum under their control. MetroPCS also clearly states that it specializes 
in offering low-cost plans that provide more limited features than its 
competitors. As Tom Keys, MetroPCS’s chief operating officer, stated, “We 
didn’t build this network or this device to be all things to all people.”308 
Requiring that all of MetroPCS’s service plans support all applications on 
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equal basis would have made it impossible for them to compete in this 
manner. 
2. AT&T/Apple FaceTime  
Apple’s video chat application FaceTime initially operated only over 
WiFi connections. In late 2012, FaceTime began supporting video calls over 
cellular networks in late 2012. AT&T initially required users to pay for a 
“Mobile Share Plan” in order to use FaceTime over the carrier’s 3G or 4G 
LTE data networks, although FaceTime over WiFi remained available to all 
AT&T customers. 309  The policy required consumers to pay for a more 
expensive data plan in order to access FaceTime over 3G or 4G LTE 
networks. The policy applied to mobile devices, including tablets with 
broadband access capabilities. Soon after announcing the policy, however, 
AT&T granted 3G and 4G FaceTime access to consumers who upgraded to 
the newest iPhone and switched to any metered data usage plan.310  
AT&T’s FaceTime policy drew criticism from network neutrality 
proponents, including public interest groups Free Press, Public Knowledge, 
and the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute. Free Press 
claims that the network neutrality issues stem from AT&T’s determination 
to block 3G and 4G accessible FaceTime “unless customers pay for a more 
expensive voice and data plan.” 311  Critics of AT&T’s FaceTime policy 
contend that it violates network neutrality rules because it differentiates 
FaceTime from similar, rival applications. They contend that AT&T’s 
treatment of FaceTime is “a direct contradiction of the Commission’s open 
internet rules for mobile providers” because it interferes with consumer 
choice between similar mobile applications.312 
AT&T has defended its policy on its consumer blog by arguing that 
(1) its FaceTime policy is “fully transparent to all consumers” and (2) there 
is no blocking issue because the FCC’s network neutrality rules do not 
regulate applications that are preloaded on the mobile device. AT&T has 
since revised its policy to make it more permissive, although it still restricts 
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usage by those subscribing to grandfathered unlimited data plans that the 
company no longer offers.313 
Because Apple FaceTime is a feature of the Apple iOS operating 
system, not a user-installed application, it is unclear whether the Open 
Internet Order applies. 314  Indeed, applying the Order would effectively 
require network providers to provide open access to all operating systems as 
well as applications. In addition, because the relevant broadband network is 
a wireless network, the nondiscrimination mandate does not apply. 315 
Moreover, the prohibition against blocking applies only to wireless 
applications that compete with AT&T’s offerings.316 Because AT&T does 
not offer video chat, a decisionmaker would have to conclude that voice 
services compete with video chat services.  
Moreover, the practice may be upheld if it constitutes reasonable 
network management.317  A leading member of the FCC’s Open Internet 
Advisory Committee has shown that a single FaceTime user can consume 
between one third and one half of all of the bandwidth available on a single 
node.318 FaceTime thus appears to be more likely to cause congestion or 
disrupt its network traffic than downloadable video chat applications. 
Moreover, the fact that FaceTime is preloaded to the most popular devices 
owned by AT&T customers may make it a bigger threat to network traffic 
management than other video chat applications. 
3. Verizon/Google Tethering Apps 
Tethering applications permit users to use mobile devices as wireless 
access points for connecting additional devices to the initial device’s 
network. 319  Until recently, providers have been able to justify blocking 
tethering applications by citing the providers’ right to reasonable network 
management.320 Providers justify charging consumers an additional fee for 
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tethering because tethering enables consumers to attach multiple devices, 
many of which have higher data capacities than phones, which in turn 
increases data usage.321 Google has granted mobile carriers’ request to block 
wireless subscribers from accessing tethering applications unless they 
subscribe to a premium data service.322 Google inadvertently made fourteen 
tethering apps available to all customers.323 When Verizon reportedly asked 
that they be removed from the Google app store, Google complied without 
complaint. 324  An end user filed an informal complaint against Verizon 
claiming that this policy violated open access requirements imposed on C 
Block licensee holders.325 
Verizon justified its additional tethering fee by arguing that tethered 
devices, such as laptops and tablets, have higher data capacities than phones, 
so customers who tethered use more data than customer who do not tether.326 
Under its tethering policy, Verizon charged both unlimited data plan 
subscribers as well as usage-based data subscribers an additional fee for 
tethering their Verizon mobile device to third party devices. Because of its 
determination to charge the latter, the additional fee seemed like an 
unnecessary distinction between the Verizon device and the third party 
device.  
In July of 2012, Verizon entered a consent decree with the FCC, in 
which the company agreed to pay $1.25 million to the FCC for its failure to 
comply with C-Block conditions requiring the company to maintain open 
access to its network for all applications and devices.327 Verizon failed to 
comply with this requirement by forcing customers to pay an additional cost 
in order to use tethering applications that connect third party devices to 
Verizon’s network.328 In addition to the fine, which amounts to little more 
than a slap on the wrist, Verizon agreed to implement a company-wide 
system to ensure compliance with the C-Block requirements of their LTE 
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network. 329  The system includes (1) training for employees on the 
requirements for licensees of C-Block spectrum, (2) legal review of all 
communications between Verizon and application store operators regarding 
availability of the application to Verizon customers, and (3) disclosure of all 
instances of noncompliance during the two-year implementation of the 
plan.330 The fact that Verizon has now shifted all of its plans to usage-based 
billing has eliminated any incentive it may have to restrict tethering apps. 
4. Verizon/Google Wallet 
Google has developed a mobile payment application called Google 
Wallet, which it has built into the proprietary chip installed in certain 
phones.331 Google Wallet permits consumers to secure digital transactions 
over a short distance using phones with a near field communication (NFC) 
chip.332 NFC payment systems enable users to pay for items in physical retail 
stores by tapping an NFC-enabled device on a payment reader. In 2011, 
Verizon determined that it would not preload Google Wallet on its mobile 
devices and may prevent users from downloading the application to devices 
after-the-fact.333 Verizon has expressed hesitance to embrace the application 
because it must ensure it is appropriately “integrated into a new, secure and 
proprietary hardware element” in the devices.334 
Critics of Verizon’s treatment of Google Wallet suggest that Verizon’s 
decision on the issue is related to its potential to partner with other mobile 
carriers, AT&T and T-Mobile, to launch a mobile payment application called 
“Softcard.” 335  Competition among mobile payment applications has 
increased as the application and e-commerce industry become more 
lucrative, as evidenced by the recent launch of Apple Pay.336 Though it is 
“still unclear whether many consumers will want to use electronic wallets,” 
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carriers and developers hope “mobile-payment platforms create new revenue 
streams by training customers to use their phones to shop.”337 
Verizon may be able to overcome complaints regarding its potentially 
discriminatory treatment of Google Wallet if it can adequately show that 
Google Wallet may jeopardize security on its network. According to some 
sources, Google Wallet may raise security concerns. A security firm called 
Zvelo contended, “the Google Wallet PIN, which is required of users to 
confirm purchases made with their phones, can be cracked via an exhaustive 
numerical search.”338 In addition, some critics contend that NFC systems 
will compromise consumer privacy. Though Google “plans to require users 
to opt into any service that would use or store their purchase data,” and even 
though “the current version of Google Wallet doesn’t allow data to be 
stored,” critics contend that NFC systems will not be consistent and 
anticipate breaches of consumer privacy.339 Both of these concerns apply to 
all NFC systems and are not unique to Google Wallet.  
A bigger threshold question is whether the fact that Google Wallet is 
a built-in feature of the chip instead of an application arguably takes it 
outside the purview of the Open Internet Order. As such, applying the Open 
Internet Order to Google Wallet would extend the Order’s scope beyond 
content, services, and applications to hardware features as well.  
5. Amazon Kindle/Zero Rating 
Amazon’s Kindle has raised a host of interesting issues as well. 
Originally, the Kindle was shipped with a proprietary network known as 
Whispernet that gave prioritized treatment to Amazon services. 340  More 
recently, the Kindle Fire accelerates content that accesses Amazon’s cloud 
services through the Silk browser.341  
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In addition, a growing number of content providers are partnering with 
network providers to ensure that their content does not count against mobile 
subscribers’ bandwidth caps. Leading examples include T-Mobile’s Music 
Freedom partnership with music streaming services, Facebook Zero, Twitter 
Zero, Wikipedia Zero, and the now defunct Google Free Zone, which are 
helping wireless broadband deploy in the developing world.342 All of these 
practices raise interesting questions that are hard to anticipate in advance. 
They provide a strong justification for adopting a case-by-case approach. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The pendency of court’s decision in Verizon created a lull in which 
everyone was on good behavior and the focus shifted away from policy and 
towards law. The lull is over, and the renewed attention to network neutrality 
has just begun. What remains to be seen is how expansively the FCC will 
interpret its authority under section 706 and whether it will attempt to 
reclassify broadband access as a Title II service. Other issues to be resolved 
include the role of the states, the applicability of network neutrality to 
interconnection between ISPs, and how case-by-case adjudication will be 
conducted. What recent events have made clearest is that the Verizon 
decision was simply a way station in the debate over network neutrality and 
that the controversy is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 
                                                                                                                          
 342. Miriam Gottfried, Mobile Banking Gets Riskier, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2011, at B9, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304887904576 
398220617110318. 
